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In this study, we show that Shariah certification leads to risk-reduction benefits. Shariah-compliant firms are 
negatively related to firm risk; and tolerate lower risk than non-Shariah-complaint firms. This evidence is in 
line with Shariah principles that prohibit controversial business activities and uncertainties. In brief, excessive 
risk-taking is discouraged. Therefore, Shariah-compliant firms need to be selective in making investment 
decisions. We further find that the negative relation applies particularly to Shariah-compliant firms that 
managed to retain their Shariah-compliant status in the subsequent reviews. This implies that these firms 
consistently maintain lower level of risk to retain their Shariah status. In terms of the corporate policies, we 
do not find evidence that Shariah-complaint firms employ conservative financial and operating leverages to 
mitigate their firm risk. Instead, Shariah-compliant firms emphasize on capital expenditures that lead to lower 
firm risk. Taken together, our results recommend that Shariah-screening process can be a significant 
mechanism to mitigate excessive risk.  
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The concept of Shariah compliance involves a stock screening process that defines and classifies 
stocks based on a set of Islamic principles. With this certification, investors’ compliance concerns 
and research costs can be reduced. Shariah certification narrows down the number of eligible halal 
stocks for the investors to invest to meet their investment need. In Malaysia, Securities 
Commission (SC) has started to release the list of Shariah-compliant stocks traded on Bursa 
Malaysia twice a year since June 1997 and the revised screening criteria was made effective from 
November 2013. As at 23 November 2017, 76% of 902 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia are listed 
as Shariah-compliant firms.  
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To pass the Shariah-compliance certification, firms must not primarily involve in any of the 
prohibited business activities and products that contain the elements of usury (riba), gambling 
(maisir) and uncertainty (gharar). Moreover, riba or riba-based elements reported in the firms’ 
financial statements should not be more than 33%, specifically for these two financial ratios: (1) 
cash over total assets and (2) total debt over total assets. Only cash placed in conventional accounts 
and interest-bearing debt are included in the quantitative assessment. However, cash placed in 
Islamic accounts or invested in Islamic marketable securities is excluded from the cash ratio 
calculation. Likewise, debt includes only interest-bearing debt. Islamic financing and sukuk are 
excluded from the calculation of 33% (Security Commission of Malaysia). 
 
To achieve the Shariah complaint status, firms may have to revise their corporate policies to 
comply with the guidelines. Firms may adopt more conservative corporate policies to meet the 
screening criteria. For example, firms may have to divest their business segments that are linked 
to non-halal activities, including investment projects with excessive risk or uncertainty (gharar), 
or revise the firms’ level of leverage to meet the financial criteria. This raises an important question 
whether the changes made will decrease firm risk. If yes, then Shariah compliant status can be an 
indirect tool to mitigate firm risk behaviour arising from riskier investment and financing policies. 
This is because excessive risk taking and mismanagement of risk can lead to expropriation of 
shareholders’ wealth (John, Litov & Yeung, 2008). However, over monitoring can be detrimental 
to firm value. To certain degree, risk taking is fundamental to firms’ survival and growth. Firms 
have to take risk to innovate and to create economic value in the competitive and complex global 
economy (Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, the Shariah-compliant status may not have significant impact on firm risk. This 
also means that there would be insignificant revision in the corporate policies to achieve the 
Shariah-compliant status. Malaysian Shariah screening methodology is claimed to be more liberal 
compared to the leading international Shariah screening providers like Dow Jones Islamic Market 
(DJIM), Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Financial 
Time Stock Exchange (FTSE). This is because Malaysian Shariah screening guidelines are more 
tolerant to firms that are involved in mixed business activities. These firms are required to comply 
with the permissible business activity benchmarks to attain the Shariah-compliant status. The 
international Shariah screening providers are more stringent whereby firms in the mixed business 
activities are excluded from their Shariah-compliant consideration (Engkuchik, 2016). 
 
The mixed arguments raise a fundamental concern as to whether the perceived less stringent 
Shariah screening criteria do have significant impact on firm risk and corporate policies. Even 
though, Ashraf (2016) shows that the differences in screening criteria do not significantly affect 
the performance of Islamic-equity indices; note that the focus of Ashraf (2016)’s study in on the 
Islamic equity funds, not on the individual firm-level perspective. Furthermore, this study not only 
examines the direct association of firm risk and Shariah-compliant status, but also considers the 
corporate policies that may have significant impact on firm risk. We examine the financial policy, 
investment policy, and operating policy. Specifically, the research questions are; (1) What is the 
relation between Shariah-compliant status and firm risk? (2) Does a Shariah-compliant firm 
tolerate less risk compared to a non-Shariah compliant firm? and (3) Which corporate policy does 
firms utilize to adjust their firm risk to meet the Shariah compliance guidelines. 
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Our study contributes to the Islamic finance literature in three ways. First, the research questions 
aim to seek additional insight to add value to Islamic finance literature from the firms’ perspective, 
in addition to the corporate risk literature. We provide consistent and robust findings that Shariah 
certification leads to overall risk-reduction. This provides a guide for investors to better understand 
the risk profile of Shariah-compliant firms in comparison to non-Shariah-compliant firms. 
Investors who are risk-averse should consider Shariah-compliant stocks in their investment 
portfolio. In addition, our findings indicate no concern of systemic risk arising from the perceived 
less stringent Shariah screening criteria.  
 
Second, our study differs from those existing studies that recognize firms only by Shariah and non 
Shariah-compliance (see for example Akguc & Rahahleh, 2018; Farooq & AbdelBari, 2015; Hooy 
& Ali, 2017). We further identify the Shariah-compliant firms into three groups, which include (1) 
firms that retain their Shariah status in the subsequent review (maintain status-quo); (2) firms that 
are newly recognized as Shariah-compliant firms (inclusion into Shariah-compliant list); and (3) 
firms that lost their Shariah certification in the subsequent review (exclusion from Shariah-
compliant list). By doing so, we manage to gauge the different impacts of Shariah status to capture 
the ongoing effects of Shariah screening process on firm risk. The investors and fund managers 
who are holding Islamic-based portfolios are required to revise their portfolios if the stocks that 
they are investing are updated as non-Shariah-complaint stocks. Commonly, these investors are 
given six months to adjust their shareholdings to comply with the Shariah screening process. 
 
Third, we look into the corporate policies, in which firms can revise to meet the Shariah compliance 
guidelines. We provide additional insights that Shariah-compliant firms do not practice 
conservative financial leverage and operating leverage. Moreover, Shariah-compliant firms are 
found to shift their investment to tangible assets, in line with the Shariah element that prohibits 
risky investment. Firms that have greater investment in real assets are commonly perceived as 
acceptable for Shariah-compliant portfolios. In brief, we recommend that Shariah certification can 
also be a tool to mitigate firm risk, in addition to other debated mechanisms to reduce firm risk.  
 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and 
hypotheses development, followed by data and methodology in section 3. Section 4 presents the 
main results and robustness analysis, while section 5 concludes the study. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior studies have documented the differences between Islamic and conventional finance from 
various perspectives (see for example Ashraf, 2016; Hussain, Shamsudin, Salehuddin, & 
Jabarullah, 2018; Li, Ee, & Rashid, 2016; Yildirim, Masih, Bacha, 2018). To the best of our 
knowledge, there is yet a specific study that examines the direct impact of Shariah-compliant status 
on firm risk and the corporate policies that reflect the changes in the firm risk. Therefore, we build 
our study based on the wider perspective from both the Islamic finance literature and risk-reduction 
hypothesis. The risk-reduction hypothesis is related to risk management that refers to how firms 
can mitigate their exposure to financial and business risk. A Shariah-compliant firm is not 
encouraged to take excessive risk to mitigate uncertainties. Shariah-compliant firms comply with 
the Shariah certification guidelines to maintain their Shariah status. Any incompliance can cause 
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the Shariah status to be removed. Therefore, the periodic semi-annual Shariah screening can be an 
efficient tool to mitigate firm risk.  
 
In general, previous studies provide evidence that Shariah-compliant securities are less risky than 
non Shariah-compliant securities. Albaity and Ahmad (2008) show that Bursa Shariah Index is less 
volatile than the conventional Bursa KLCI Index. Likewise, Chiadmi and Ghaiti (2012) report 
consistent findings when comparing the volatility of S&P Shariah with the conventional S&P500. 
These studies claim that Shariah-compliant indices pose lower risk. The indices select stocks based 
on Islamic principles and are subject to periodic, as well as more stringent screening process than 
the conventional counterparts. Ashraf, Felixson, Khawaja and Hussain (2017) show that the lower 
risk is traded off with lower returns. This is because the corporate policies of Shariah-compliant 
firms are constrained by the quantitative criteria imposed on Shariah-compliant firms. Some 
studies add that investment in Shariah-compliant stocks discourages speculation and excessive 
risk- taking activities (Naughton & Naughton, 2000; Obaidullah, 2001). On the contrary, Akhtar 
and Jahromi (2017) document that Shariah-compliant stocks are mean–variance efficient than non-
Shariah-compliant stocks and the market, suggesting that Shariah-compliant stocks can reduce risk 
of the same level of returns compared to conventional stocks.  
 
In addition to reviewing studies in the Islamic finance, we highlight that the fundamental intention 
of Shariah certification is consistent with the concept of investment based on ethical belief (Reddy 
& Fu, 2014). It is argued that key difference of the ethical stocks is the criteria used to screen the 
firms. For example, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) complaint stocks are screened based 
on a set of CSR guidelines, while corporate environmental responsibility (CER) compliant stocks 
are filtered based on the CER screening criteria. On the other hand, the Shariah-complaint stocks 
are screened based on a set of Islamic principles. Generally, firms that integrate ethics and social 
responsibility into their strategic planning are found to be associated with lower risk (see for 
example, Cai, Cui & Jo, 2015; Harjoto & Laksmana, 2016; Jo & Na, 2012; Sun & Cui, 2014). 
 
Harjoto and Laksmana (2016) find that CSR engagement reduces deviations from optimal 
corporate risk taking. In return, CSR leads to higher firm value. The risk reduction benefit through 
CSR engagement is found to be more significant among firms in the controversial industry than 
those in non-controversial industry (Jo & Na, 2012). Controversial industries are defined as 
unethical or socially irresponsible business activities that include tobacco, gambling, weapon, 
alcohol and adult entertainment, which is the same as those defined in the Islamic principles. Jo 
and Na (2012) show that the reported negative relation between CSR engagement and firm risk is 
associated with risk management improvement that reduces the exposure to financial, social and 
environment crisis, and therefore lower the firm risk.  
 
In terms of the Shariah certification status, previous studies report significant impact on stock 
returns associated with the announcement of Shariah-compliant securities (Ashraf, 2016; Lusyana 
& Sherif, 2017; McGowan & Muhammad, 2010; Ng & Zhu, 2016; Yazi et al., 2015). A firm is 
subject to periodic Shariah review. If a Shariah-complaint firm fails to meet any of the compliance 
requirements, the firm will lose its Shariah-compliant status in the subsequent review. In other 
words, the firm will be excluded from the list of approved Shariah-compliant counters. A firm can 
also be listed as Shariah-compliant firm for the very first time or manage to maintain its status quo 
as Shariah-complaint firm in the periodic screening process. Each of the Shariah certification status 
leads to different impact on the stock returns.  
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Both the inclusion and exclusion of stocks from the Shariah-compliant index are found to have 
significant impact on the firm stock returns, mainly in the short run (Ng & Zhu, 2016). Significant 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are reported when the affected firms 
obtain their Shariah-compliant status (Sadeghi, 2011). In contrast, a significant negative stock 
returns are observed when firms fail to maintain their Shariah-compliant status in the subsequent 
review. These findings suggest that the Shariah certification status is a significant information for 
investors. The investors such as the fund managers must revise their investment portfolios based 
on the updated list of Shariah-compliant firms. They must decide to either buy, sell or hold the 
affected stocks based on the updated list. Usually, investors are given a grace period of six months 
to sell non Shariah-compliant stocks from their Islamic-based portfolios.  
 
The portfolio revision contributes to improved liquidity of the Shariah-compliant stocks. Sadeghi 
(2008) reports higher trading volume and lower bid-ask spread, immediately after the 
announcement of the list of approved Shariah-compliant stocks. Similarly, Ng and Zhu (2016) 
show that changes in the Shariah-compliant index composition have significant positive impact on 
the affected stocks’ trading volume in both the short and long run. A liquid stock is also argued to 
be less risky. Based on the literature review, we therefore, hypothesise that Shariah-complaint firm 
is less risky compared to its counterpart. Our hypothesis is also backed by the underlying argument 
of risk-reduction hypothesis. The first hypothesis of this study is stated below: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Shariah certification is negatively related to firm risk 
 
Prior studies also show that firms can reduce firm risk through more conservative corporate 
policies (Serfling, 2014; Sila, Gonzalez & Hagendorff, 2016). To cite an example, Razali and 
Ibrahim (2012) find that, Shariah-compliant firms quickly adjust their financial leverage policy to 
meet the target capital structure to attain Shariah-compliant status. Shariah and non-Shariah 
compliant firms employ difference financial decisions, which include leveraging, dividend payout 
and working capital (Naz, Shah, & Kutan, 2017). Shariah-compliant firms are also found to engage 
in lower earnings management than non-Shariah-compliant firms. The Shariah-compliant firms 
maintain lower debt ratio, lower account receivables and lower cash ratio so that firm managers 
have lower chances to misreport (Farooq & AbdelBari, 2015). These results also imply that 
Shariah-stock screening process can act as an external monitoring agent to safeguard the 
shareholders’ interest.  
 
Taken together, we expect Shariah screening guidelines to lead firm to conservative corporate 
policy that ultimately lower firm risk. On the corporate channels, we examine two possible 
channels, in which firms can revise to meet the Shariah compliance guidelines. If Shariah 
certification is negatively related to firm risk, we expect firms to reduce risk through conservative 
financing and investment policies. Financial leverage is found to be positively related to corporate 
risk-taking. The higher the financial leverage the higher the riskiness of a firm (Boubakri, Mansi, 
& Saffar, 2013; Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2011; Serfling, 2014). Therefore, to mitigate firm risk, 
Shariah-compliant firms maintain lower leverage ratios. Shariah-compliant firms can also reduce 
risk through more conservative investment policies. We examine two mechanisms through which 
firms can influence the investment policies. Firstly, firms can adjust their policies to reduce 
investment in fixed costs to lower operating leverage because the performance of firms with higher 
level of operating leverage are more sensitive to fluctuations in sales, and thus are riskier 
(Mandelker & Rhee, 1984; Serfling, 2014). Second, higher capital expenditures are also associated 
1262 Firm Risk And Corporate Policies: From The Shariah Certification Perspective  
with higher corporate risk taking. We expect Shariah-compliant firms are more likely to decrease 
their investment in capital expenditures to mitigate firm risk. In short, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Shariah certification is negatively related to financial leverage, operating leverage 





3.1.  Sample Selection 
 
The sample consists of 729 non-financial listed firms on Bursa Malaysia stock exchange. Financial 
firms are excluded from our sample because of the differences in their risk characteristics, financial 
structure and regulations compared to the non-financial firms. The unbalanced panel dataset covers 
from the year 2000 to 2016, with 6,618 firm-year observations after excluding observations with 
missing financial information. To examine the effects of Shariah certification on firm risk and 
corporate policies, we have to hand-collect the list of Shariah and non Shariah-compliant firms 
from the SC’s website. The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of SC is responsible to review and 
update the list of firms that retain their Shariah status, newly approved Shariah-compliant firms, 
and firms that lost their Shariah status. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by industry. 
33.03% of the sample observations are of industrial firms, followed by 23.19% in consumer goods, 
and approximately 8% each in basic materials, consumer services and technology.  
 
 
Table 1: Sample Distribution by Industry 
Industry Firm-year observation Percent 
Basic materials 515 7.78 
Consumer goods 1,535 23.19 
Consumer services 495 7.48 
Healthcare 123 1.86 
Industrials 2,186 33.03 
Oil and Gas 111 1.68 
Technology 523 7.90 
Telecommunication 174 2.63 
Others 956 14.45 
Total 6,618 100 
 
3.2.  Research Methodology  
 
We use multivariate panel data regression, controlling for industry fixed effect because the Shariah 
certification guidelines are mainly driven by the nature of the firms’ business activities. Our 
regression model also includes year fixed effect to control for temporal effect, if any. The 
regression model is adjusted for robust standard error clustered at the firm level. The regression 
specification is written as follows: 
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Riski,t= β0 + β1Shariah i,t + β2Financial leveragei,t + β3Cash ratioi,t + β4Market to booki,t
+ β5Sales growth + β6Profitabilityi,t + β7Tangibilityi,t + β8Firm  sizei,t
+ β9Firm age i,t + αi + εi,t 
 
3.3.  Variables Specification  
 
We use three measures to proxy for firm risk. Total risk measures the overall riskiness of firms, 
while Idiosyncratic risk measures the firm-specific risk. These two variables measure the equity 
risk (Serfling, 2014; Sila et al., 2016). SD(ROA) is included to measure the degree of firm risk 
based on operating performance. Riskier corporate operations lead to more volatile earnings (John 
et al., 2008). The main variable of interest is Shariah certification that is represented by a dummy 
variable. We include Cash ratio as one of the control variables (Serfling, 2014) to measure firm 
liquidity and ability to meet short-term financing obligations. A firm with a higher cash ratio is 
considered solvent and thus is less risky. In addition, we control for a set of variables that are 
commonly found to have significant impact on firm risk (Boubakri et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2011; 
Serfling, 2014; Sila et al., 2016). Market to book ratio and Sales growth are included to control for 
firm-specific growth opportunities. Firms with higher growth opportunities are found to take more 
risk (Faccio, et al., 2011; Sila, et al, 2016). Less profitable firms are also found to take more risk 
to increase the firm returns.  
 
Firms with higher tangible assets have higher liquidation value, thus is expected to be negatively 
related to risk. Tangibility is also a proxy of pledgeability, which is positively related to firm risk. 
The higher the degree of pledgeable assets, the higher the capacity to borrow to invest (Almeida 
& Campello, 2007). Additionally, we control for the effect of firm size and firm age. Smaller firms 
and younger firms are more risk seeking than larger and older firms (Faccio, et al. 2011; John, et 
al. 2008). These firms must take more risk to further expand their business operations, thus these 
firms are riskier. The measures of risk, corporate policies and firm-specific control variables are 
collected from the Datastream database.  
 
Firm risk can also be reflected in the corporate policies. Financial leverage is used as the proxy of 
financial policy. For the investment policies, we examine the operating leverage and capital 
expenditures. Firms with higher degree of financial leverage, operating leverage and capital 
expenditures tend to be riskier (Serfling, 2014). To mitigate the risk, firms can opt for conservative 
corporate policies. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles to control 
for any potential bias due to outliers. The description of each variable is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the identified variables. On average, firms are 
exposed to 51.66% of risk measured by the Total risk. The mean of Idiosyncratic risk is 50.14%, 
while operating risk is 4.76%. In terms of the corporate policies, firms maintain an average of 
18.80% of debt ratio, 26.01% of operating leverage and 3.7% of additional investment in capital 
expenditures. For the main variables, 76.88% of the sample consist of Shariah-compliant 
observations, while the remaining 23.12% are non Shariah-compliant observations Table 4 reports 
the Pearson correlations of the observed variables. The correlation matrix does not suggest any 
serious multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 2: Variables Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables:  
Risk taking measures:  
Total risk  Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over the last year. 
Idiosyncratic risk Annualized standard deviation of the residuals from the market model 
regression. 
SD(ROA) Standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets (ROA) over three-year 
overlapping periods. For example, the amount of risk for year 2000 is 
measured as the volatility of ROA from year 2010 to 2012. 
Corporate channels:  
Financial leverage Total debt to total assets 
Operating leverage Percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over 
percentage change in sales  
Capital expenditures Additional capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
Independent variables:  
Shariah Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm is a Shariah-compliant firm for 
the observed year, and 0 otherwise. 
Cash ratio Cash to total assets 
Market to book  Market to book ratio 
Sales growth Annual growth rate of sales. 
Profitability Profitability proxy measured by return on assets (ROA). 
Tangibility Net plant and equipment to total asset 
Firm size Natural log of total assets 
Firm age Natural log of the number of years from the establishment of the firm to 
the year of observation.  
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total risk 6,618 0.5166 0.4284 0.3395 0.1107 2.1274 
Idiosyncratic risk 6,618 0.5014 0.4097 0.3394 0.1053 2.1204 
SD(ROA) 6,021 0.0476 0.0257 0.0716 0.0013 0.5079 
Shariah 6,618 0.7688 1.0000 0.4216 0.0000 1.0000 
Cash ratio 6,618 1.1592 0.0720 4.8135 0.0001 39.3440 
Market to book 6,618 1.1905 0.8300 1.2327 -0.1100 8.5900 
Sales growth 6,618 0.1309 0.0578 0.5645 -0.8616 3.7133 
Profitability 6,618 0.0483 0.0522 0.1011 -0.4143 0.3365 
Tangibility 6,618 0.3531 0.3368 0.2262 0.0024 0.9388 
Firm size 6,618 12.7124 12.5907 1.5248 9.4940 17.4772 
Firm age 6,618 2.3574 2.4849 0.7010 0.6931 3.4012 
Financial leverage 6,618 0.1880 0.1522 0.1694 0.0000 0.7239 
Operating leverage 6,476 0.2601 0.1389 3.6400 -18.1426 20.5776 
Capital expenditure 6,605 0.0370 0.0204 0.0460 0.0000 0.2422 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1.  Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the univariate analysis. The analysis examines if the risk profiles, 
corporate policies and firm-level characteristics of Shariah-compliant firms differ from those of 
non Shariah-compliant firms. We conduct both the mean difference test (t-test) and median 
difference test (z-test). Based on the t-test, there is insignificant difference in the firm risk between 
the two groups. However, the z-test shows that Shariah-compliant firms are slightly riskier relative 
to non Shariah-compliant firms by 1.24% (marginally significant at the 10% level) and 1.83% 
(significant at the 5% level) measured by Total risk and Idiosyncratic risk, respectively. 
Nonetheless, this analysis does not consider other variables that may have significant impact on 
firm risk. On the riskiness of the operating performance, Shariah-compliant firms are less risky 
compared to non Shariah-compliant firms. The univariate analysis provides some evidence in 
support of the hypothesized negative relation between Shariah certification and firm risk.  
 
In addition, Shariah-compliant firms are financially less levered than non Shariah-compliant firms. 
On average (median), Shariah-compliant firms maintain a debt ratio of 18.33%, (14.94%) whereas 
non Shariah-compliant firms maintain a higher debt ratio of 20.35% (16.29%). On the investment 
side, there is insignificant mean difference in the degree of operating leverage between the two 
groups of firms, but z-test finds a marginally significant difference where Shariah-compliant firms 
are found to use less operating leverage compared to non Shariah-compliant firms. Instead, 
Shariah-compliant firms are consistently found to have higher capital expenditures ratio than non 
Shariah-compliant firms. This finding agrees with the Shariah element that encourages investment 
in tangible assets.  
 
 
Table 5: Univariate Analysis  
 Shariah Non-Shariah Shariah – Non-Shariah 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean difference 
Median 
difference 
Total risk 0.5165 0.4310 0.5169 0.4186 -0.0004 0.0124* 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.5020 0.4127 0.4996 0.3944 0.0024 0.0183** 
SD(ROA) 0.0441 0.0253 0.0595 0.0277 -0.0154*** -0.0024** 
Cash ratio 1.2144 0.0805 0.9755 0.0529 0.2389* 0.0276*** 
Market to book 1.1439 0.8100 1.3454 0.8800 -0.2015*** -0.0700*** 
Sales growth 0.1337 0.0613 0.1214 0.0441 0.0123 0.0172 
Profitability 0.0537 0.0563 0.0301 0.0361 0.0236*** 0.0202*** 
Tangibility 0.3725 0.3674 0.2885 0.2405 0.084*** 0.1269*** 
Firm size 12.5877 12.4806 13.1272 13.1074 -0.5395*** -0.6268*** 
Firm age 2.3242 2.3979 2.4679 2.7081 -0.1437*** -0.3102*** 
Financial leverage 0.1833 0.1494 0.2035 0.1629 -0.0202*** -0.0135** 
Operating leverage 0.2429 0.1322 0.3183 0.1654 -0.0754 -0.0332* 
Capital expenditure 0.0405 0.0243 0.0253 0.0091 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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4.2.  Shariah Certification and Firm Risk 
 
In this section, we discuss the estimates of the multivariate panel data analysis that examines the 
relation between Shariah certification and firm risk. We hypothesize that Shariah-compliant firms 
are likely to take less risk than non Shariah-compliant firms, and therefore the coefficient of 
Shariah variable is expected to be negative. Table 6 reports the findings of the analysis. The results 
in Models 1 to 3 suggest a consistent negative relation between Shariah certification and firm risk. 
Referring to Model 1 (Model 2) the coefficient of Total risk (Idiosyncratic risk) indicates that the 
equity risk of Shariah-compliant firms is lower than non Shariah-compliant firms by 4.45% 
(4.44%). Both are significant at the 1% level. While in Model 3, the negative coefficient of Shariah 
variable implies that the volatility of the operating performance is lower by 0.89%, which is 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
For the control variables, we show that the higher the financial gearing, the greater the risk to equity 
owners. This is consistent with the trade-off theory, where the marginal cost of debt financing 
would outweigh the marginal benefit as firms further increases their financial leverage. 
Additionally, firms may have lower capacity to accept positive net present value investment project 
due to the higher leverage that causes firms to have lower tolerance of risk (Diamond & He, 2014; 
Myers, 1977). Cash ratio is insignificant to explain the degree of firm risk in all models reported 
in Table 5. Conversely, well performing firms and larger firms are associated with less risk taking, 
indicated by the negative coefficients of Profitability and Firm size. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities are associated with lower equity risk, but high growth firms are more to volatile 
corporate earnings. Additionally, tangibility ratio is negatively related to SD(ROA), but is 
insignificant when risk is measured by the equity risk. The significant negative relation is in line 
with the argument that firms with higher tangible assets have more collateral for debt financing 
and higher liquidation value in the event of bankruptcy; hence the lower firm risk.  
 
Overall, the baseline regression model provides evidence in support of our hypothesis. Shariah 
certification is negatively related to firm risk, which agrees with the strand of literature that has 
documented several control mechanisms to mitigate firm risk. Accordingly, firms that engage in 
Shariah-compliance business are perceived to be less risky by the market in general. The Shariah 
principles prohibits controversial business activities and/or products that are related to alcoholic 
beverages, gambling and prostitution. In addition, to comply with the element of uncertainty, 
Shariah-compliant firms must be more selective with their investment choices. Less risky 
investment reflects the firms’ vigilant investment policies that promotes the sanctity of a contract. 
 
 
Table 6: Shariah Certification and Firm Risk 
 Total risk Idiosyncratic risk SD(ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Shariah -0.0445*** -0.0444*** -0.0089** 
 (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0230) 
Financial leverage 0.2767*** 0.2780*** 0.0073 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5179) 
Cash ratio 0.0027 0.0027 0.0003 
 (0.1825) (0.1820) (0.6442) 
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 Total risk Idiosyncratic risk SD(ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Market to book -0.0086** -0.0088** 0.0100*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0122) (0.0000) 
Sales growth -0.0099* -0.0101* -0.0004 
 (0.0967) (0.0922) (0.7673) 
Profitability -0.7899*** -0.7724*** -0.2687*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0048 -0.0007 -0.0159** 
 (0.8572) (0.9787) (0.0365) 
Firm size -0.0991*** -0.1028*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm age 0.0126 0.0130 -0.0007 
 (0.1744) (0.1584) (0.7457) 
Constant 1.8098*** 1.8092*** 0.1641*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES 
Observations 6,618 6,618 6,021 
Adjusted R2 0.3975 0.4019 0.1948 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
4.3 Shariah Certification and Corporate Policies 
 
The evidence reported in Table 6 captures only the direct effects of Shariah certification on the 
riskiness of firms. In this section, we examine specific channels that may have indirect effects on 
the overall firm risk. We examine whether Shariah certification affects corporate financing and 
investment decisions. We re-estimate the baseline model, but with financial leverage, operating 
leverage and capital expenditures as the dependent variables. Referring to Model 1 in Table 7, 
Shariah certification is not significantly related to financial leverage, suggesting that Shariah 
certified firms do not reduce risk through more conservative financial policies. Instead, the 
financial gearing of Shariah-compliant firms does not differ from non Shariah-compliant firms.  
 
Table 7: Shariah Certification and Corporate Policies 
 Financial leverage Operating leverage Capital expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Shariah -0.0055 -0.0330 0.0080*** 
 (0.2580) (0.7709) (0.0000) 
Cash ratio 0.0002 0.0205** -0.0002* 
 (0.7159) (0.0387) (0.0540) 
Market to book -0.0024 0.0828** 0.0048*** 
 (0.1583) (0.0379) (0.0000) 
Sales growth -0.0040 -0.1198 0.0008 
 (0.2517) (0.1375) (0.4040) 
 Karren Lee-Hwei Khaw, Sabariah Nordin, Woei-Chyuan Wong 1269 
 Financial leverage Operating leverage Capital expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Profitability -0.3148*** -1.1639** 0.0330*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0186) (0.0000) 
Tangibility 0.0981*** 0.1246 0.0649*** 
 (0.0000) (0.5548) (0.0000) 
Firm size 0.0300*** 0.0398 0.0014*** 
 (0.0000) (0.2533) (0.0004) 
Firm age -0.0072** 0.0877 -0.0140*** 
 (0.0249) (0.2394) (0.0000) 
Constant -0.1345*** -0.8849 0.0143** 
 (0.0000) (0.1346) (0.0206) 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES 
Observations 6,618 6,476 6,605 
Adjusted R2 0.1282 0.0019 0.1855 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
We put forward two reasons to justify the insignificant finding. First, the riba element only restrict 
the use of interest-bearing securities. Likewise, the newly introduced financial benchmark that 
requires firms to maintain a debt ratio below 33% only applies to interest-bearing securities. This 
means Shariah-compliant firms can continue to utilize financial gearing to finance their investment 
opportunities by issuing Sukuk bonds. Second, there is convenient access to Islamic capital market. 
Over the years, the Sukuk market of Malaysia has achieved significant growth and surpassed the 
conventional bond issuance as a main channel to raise financing need. As at 2017, corporate Sukuk 
issuance reached MYR133.7 billion surpassing conventional bond issuance of MYR106.4 billion 
(International Islamic Financial Market, 2018). The easy access to Islamic capital market enables 
Shariah-compliant firms to conveniently raise the needed fund from Shariah-compliant debt 
securities. 
 
On the investment policies, we first examine the relation between Shariah certification and 
operating leverage. Firms with higher operating leverage are related to higher risk (Serfling, 2014). 
If Shariah-compliant firms are associated with less risk compared to non Shariah-compliant firms, 
the coefficient of Shariah variable is expected to load negative in Model 2. However, the results 
show that there is insignificant relation between Shariah certification and firm operating leverage, 
which means Shariah-compliant firms do not use operating leverage as one of the corporate 
channels to decrease the overall firm risk. The second proxy of corporate investment policies is the 
capital expenditures and the results are presented in Model 3. The capital expenditures consist of 
additional investment in the fixed assets over total assets. Instead of decreasing the capital 
expenditures to reduce firm risk, Shariah-compliant firms are found to increase their investment as 
indicated by the significantly positive coefficient of the Shariah variable at the 1% level. This can 
be linked to the underlying Shariah principles that emphasize on tangible assets investment. 
Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that Shariah-compliant firms do not use financial leverage 
and/or operating leverage as a tool to change their firms’ overall risk. Instead, Shariah-compliant 
firms place more emphasis on investment in tangible assets to reduce uncertainty in investment.  
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4.4.  Status of Shariah Certification and Firm Risk 
 
In this section, we re-estimate the regression model to examine the different effect of Shariah status 
on the firm risk and corporate policies. We further classify the Shariah status as Retain Shariah, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm maintains its status quo as Shariah-
compliant firm for the observed year, and zero otherwise. New Shariah takes the value of one if it 
is the first time the firm obtains the Shariah certification, while Removed Shariah is also a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the firm is excluded from the list of Shariah-compliant firms, and 
zero otherwise. The results are tabulated in Table 8.  
 
Consistently, firms that retain their Shariah-compliant status is negatively related to firm risk. 
Based on Model 1, Shariah-compliant firms that can retain their Shariah status in the following 
years are exposed to lower firm risk by 4.84%. The equity risk measure is significant at the 1% 
level. For brevity, we exclude the discussion for Idiosyncratic risk because the results are highly 
consistent with those reported using Total risk as the dependent variable. When SD(ROA) is used 
as the dependent variable, we also find negative relation between Retain Shariah and the riskiness 
of corporate performance. The volatility of earnings is marginally lower by 0.79%.  
 
In contrast, newly certified Shariah-compliant firms are associated with higher equity risk as 
presented in Models 2. The equity risk of newly approved Shariah-compliant firms is higher by 
7.26%. Potentially, it is due to shifting in demand when investors opt to include the newly certified 
stock in their Shariah-compliant portfolios. This argument is consistent with prior studies that 
examine the effects of changes in index composition. Inclusion of stocks in the index could 
promote better scrutiny from the market participants (Shleifer, 1986). As a result, stock prices and 
trading volume are significantly affected by the index revision (Bildik & Gulay, 2008; Cheung & 
Roca, 2013; Ng & Zhu, 2016). However, the coefficient of New Shariah loads negative when 
SD(ROA) is the dependent variable. The firm risk is lower by 0.97%. This suggests that the newly 
certified Shariah firms are exposed to higher equity risk because of the investors’ demand shift, 
but these firms do mitigate their business risk, measured by SD(ROA) to meet the Shariah 
compliance guidelines.  
 
Table 8: Different Status of Shariah Certification and Firm Risk 
 Total risk SD(ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Retain Shariah -0.0484***   -0.0079**   
 (0.0008)   (0.0362)   
New Shariah  0.0726**   -0.0097**  
  (0.0161)   (0.0459)  
Removed 
Shariah   0.0067   -0.0123** 
   (0.8802)   (0.0269) 
Financial 
leverage 0.2764*** 0.2780*** 0.2783*** 0.0073 0.0074 0.0074 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5204) (0.5126) (0.5165) 
Cash ratio 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.1799) (0.1755) (0.1797) (0.6430) (0.6570) (0.6563) 
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 Total risk SD(ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market to 
book -0.0086** -0.0074** -0.0074** 0.0100*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0361) (0.0346) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sales growth -0.0097 -0.0096 -0.0099* -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.1037) (0.1074) (0.0971) (0.7881) (0.7335) (0.7510) 
Profitability -0.7870*** -0.8184*** -0.8189*** -0.2695*** -0.2754*** -0.2755*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0037 -0.0204 -0.0199 -0.0164** -0.0189** -0.0191** 
 (0.8884) (0.4247) (0.4361) (0.0316) (0.0148) (0.0140) 
Firm size -0.0993*** -0.0971*** -0.0971*** -0.0079*** -0.0075*** -0.0075*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Firm age 0.0123 0.0132 0.0135 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.1841) (0.1562) (0.1472) (0.7421) (0.8219) (0.8236) 
Constant 1.8134*** 1.7564*** 1.7579*** 0.1628*** 0.1539*** 0.1540*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry fixed 
effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed 
effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,618 6,618 6,618 6,021 6,021 6,021 
Adjusted R2 0.3982 0.3954 0.3948 0.1943 0.1926 0.1925 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
For firms that have lost their Shariah-compliant status, the coefficient of Removed Shariah is 
reported to be insignificant in Models 3 but is negatively significant in Model 6. From our panel 
dataset, we find that majority of the firms that are excluded from the list of Shariah-compliant 
stocks managed to retain their Shariah certification in the following one or two years after the 
removal. Therefore, firms that are keen to be certified as Shariah-compliant, are unlikely to take 
up risky business activities to comply with the Shariah certification guidelines. We also examine 
the relation between Shariah’s status and corporate policies. Our results provide further evidence 
in support of the findings reported in Table 7. The results are not reported for brevity but are 
available upon request. Similarly, we do not find significant relation between Shariah’s status with 
financial leverage and operating leverage. While firms that retain their Shariah certification are 
significantly and positively related to capital expenditures.  
 
4.5.  Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we discuss the results of the robustness tests that refer to the baseline regression 
model presented in Table 6. For brevity, the results are not presented, but are available upon 
request. First, we examine whether there is a potential bias in our reported results caused by the 
identification of the Shariah-compliant status. SC announces and updates the list of Shariah and 
non Shariah-compliant stocks twice a year that is once in the first half (May) and another in the 
second half (November) of the year. Since our dataset consists of annual observations, we identify 
the Shariah-compliant status based on the list announced at the end of each year. The potential 
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identification bias could happen if a firm’s Shariah-compliant status in the first half of the year 
differs from the status in the second half of the year. To account for this concern, we screen through 
the dataset and identify only 31 affected observations. We expect the small number of observations 
are not going to have much significant impact on the reported results thus far, but we do repeat the 
analyses presented in Tables 6 to 8. We use the alternative sample that excludes the affected 
observations to further confirm the findings of this study. Consistently, we find significant negative 
relation between Shariah certification and firm risk. From the corporate channel’s perspective, 
Shariah-compliant firms do not reduce risk through more conservative financial leverage and 
operating leverage but increase their investment in tangible assets.  
 
Next, we repeat the baseline panel data regression analysis using the median panel data regression 
model to consider the differences between the mean and median values presented in Tables 3 
Moreover, the mean difference test and median difference test (refer to Table 5) generate 
inconsistent findings, particularly on the firm risk between Shariah and non Shariah-compliant 
firms. The reported negative relation between Shariah certification and firm risk remain significant 
in the quantile regression analysis, and thus providing further evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
Lastly, we capture the potential growth effect that may affect the reported negative relation 
between Shariah certification and firm risk. Accordingly, firms with higher growth opportunities 
have higher incentives take more risk (Faccio, et al., 2011; Sila, et al, 2016). If this is the case then, 
our results could be driven by firms with lower growth opportunities. Furthermore, in Table 6 the 
coefficients of Market to book and Sales growth take negative signs, which contradict with our 
expectation. Therefore, we perform a subsamples analysis, where the full sample is divided into 
firms with low and high growth opportunities. Firms with market to book ratio below the 25th 
(above the 75th) percentile are considered the low (high) growth opportunities firms. Our results 
remain consistent and in support of the hypothesis, confirming that the reported results are, as well 





Several initiatives have been taken to enhance the product and services offerings of Islamic capital 
markets. One of the many efforts includes the certification of Shariah-compliant stocks. The list of 
Shariah-compliant firms is updated and announced semiannually beginning June 1997. The 
screening process is ongoing, which means a firm’s Shariah status can be revoked if it fails to meet 
any of the qualitative or quantitative guidelines. In fact, the concept of Shariah certification is in 
line with the studies on business ethics and social responsibility, but with different underlying 
screening criteria. Shariah certification screens firms based on a set of Islamic principles and caters 
for the need of investors investing in stocks that meet their spiritual values. This study differs from 
the prior studies on Shariah-compliant firms that mainly focus on the post announcement effects 
of Shariah certification from the investment perspective such as the effects on stock prices, trading 
volume and stock liquidity. We take a closer look on the Shariah certification from the corporate 
finance perspective. We examine whether Shariah certification is associated with risk-reduction. 
We argue that to comply with the Shariah guidelines, firms must revise their risk-taking 
preferences through several corporate policies. Consistently, we find evidence in support of the 
negative relation between Shariah certification and firm risk. Shariah certification does lead to risk-
reduction, and in return Shariah-compliant firms pay lower cost of debt. Our study also provide 
evidence that Shariah-compliant firms are more likely to invest in tangible assets to mitigate 
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investment uncertainties. In summary, our study contributes to the growing literature on Islamic 
finance. We provide an implication to the stakeholders, mainly the shareholders and investors that 
Shariah certification can be an effective mechanism to mitigate excessive firm risk, in addition to 
the other debated tools such as board of directors, audit committee, management compensation, 
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